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Abstract: A basic assumption often made in risk- and reliability-based inspection planning is
that a Bayesian approach can be used. This implies that probabilities of failure can be updated
in a consistent way when new information (from inspections and repairs) becomes available.
The Bayesian approach and a no-crack detection assumption imply that the inspection time inter-
vals usually become longer and longer with time. For ageing platforms several small cracks should
be expected to be observed according to the bath-tub curve development often assumed –
implying an increased risk for crack initiation (and coalescence of small cracks) and increased
crack growth. This should imply shorter inspection time intervals for ageing structures. Different
approaches for updating inspection plans for older installations are proposed. The most promis-
ing method consists of increasing the rate of crack initiations at the end of the expected lifetime –
corresponding to a bath-tub hazard rate effect. The approach illustrated is for welded steel details
in platforms. Systems effects are considered, including the use of dependence between inspection
and failure events in different components for inspection planning.
Keywords: reliability and risk-based inspection planning, ageing offshore installations,
Bayesian approach, system reliability, fatigue
1 INTRODUCTION
Reliability and risk-based inspection (RBI) planning
for offshore structures has been an area of high practi-
cal interest over recent decades. The first develop-
ments were in inspection planning for welded
connections subject to fatigue crack growth in fixed
steel offshore platforms. This application area for RBI
is now the most developed. Formerly, practical appli-
cations of RBI required significant expertise in the
areas of structural reliability theory and fatigue and
fracture mechanics [1]. This made practical imple-
mentation in industry difficult. Recently, generic and
simplified approaches for RBI have been formulated,
making it possible to base inspection planning on a
few key parameters commonly applied in the determi-
nistic design of structures, e.g. the fatigue design fac-
tor (FDF) and the reserve strength ratio (RSR) [2, 3].
The basic assumption made in risk/reliability-
based inspection planning is that a Bayesian
approach can be used. This implies that probabil-
ities of failure can be updated in a consistent way
when new information (from inspections) becomes
available. Further, the RBI approach for inspection
planning presented in references [2] and [3] is based
on the assumption that at all future inspections no
cracks are detected. If a crack is detected, then
a new inspection plan should be developed. The
Bayesian approach and the no-crack detection
assumption imply that the inspection time intervals
usually become longer and longer with time.
By its nature, damage will accumulate in structures
exposed to conditions of stress cycles. The structures
will ultimately reach a state in which they are judged
to be no longer fit for service. By then, unless repaired
or re-rated, the structure may be said to have reached
the end of its life. As damage accumulates, failure
becomes increasingly probable, and if not withdrawn
from service, failure of some kind will eventually
occur. There is a dearth of guidelines for inspection
planning of ageing offshore installations in both
scientific papers and regulations and standards to
cope with this problem. Within the aviation industry
this subject has been given more attention as a result
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of, among other things, the fuselage failure of the
Aloha Boeing 737-200 aircraft on 28 April 1988 [4].
The resulting regulation for ageing aircraft has led
to decreased inspection intervals. The guiding princi-
ples for inspection planning for ageing aircraft are
based on the damage tolerance philosophy, or safety
by inspection. According to reference [4] ‘The
damage tolerance philosophy is based on the princi-
ple that while cracks due to fatigue and corrosion
will develop in the aircraft structure, the process
can be understood and controlled. A key element is
the development of a comprehensive programme of
inspections to detect cracks before they can affect
flight safety. That is, damage tolerant structures are
designed to sustain cracks without catastrophic fail-
ure until the damage is detected in scheduled inspec-
tions and the damaged part is repaired or replaced.’
To ensure that this occurs, there should be at least
two opportunities to detect the crack prior to it
reaching its critical length [4], as illustrated in Fig. 1.
A similar approach could be taken for ageing
offshore installations that also reflects accessibility
for inspection and consequence classes, represented
by FDFs. This would require N¼FDF opportunities
to detect the crack prior to it reaching its critical
length in areas that have passed their fatigue life.
This approach has in practice been required by the
Petroleum Safety Authority Norway.
This normally leads toan inspection interval decreas-
ing with age, and is more in line with expectations of
the need to inspect ageing structures. In contrast, the
Bayesian approach and the no-crack detection imply
that the inspection time intervals usually become
longer and longer.
Further, inspection planning based on the RBI
approach implies that single fatigue critical com-
ponents are considered, one at a time, but with
acceptable reliability levels assessed based on the
consequences for the whole structure in case of the
fatigue failure of single components.
Examples and information on RBI and mainte-
nance planning can be found in a number of papers,
e.g. references [1–3] and [5–14]. Important aspects
are systems considerations, design using robustness
considerations by accidental collapse limit states,
and use of monitoring by the ‘leak before break’ prin-
ciple to identify damage.
The above methods for RBI have been developed in
principle for new offshore structures, where possible
ageing effects are unimportant. Figure 2 shows
the installation years for fixed offshore structures in
the Norwegian part of the North Sea. It is seen that
a considerable number of platforms are more than
30 years old, and have passed or are close to their
design lifetime.
For ageing installations an increasing number of
small defects/cracks are expected to be observed
according to the bath-tub curve development often
assumed. This assumption has not yet been sup-
ported by observation of offshore installations, but
experience from other industries such as aviation
indicates that widespread fatigue damage can be a
significant problem for ageing structures, especially
in combination with corrosion; e.g. see reference
[15]. This study is thus based on an assumption of
potential increased crack initiation being present for
ageing structures, and the intention of the study is
to identify models resulting in more frequent inspec-
tions for ageing structures. Widespread fatigue
implies an increased risk for defect/crack initiation
(and the coalescence of small defects/cracks) and
increased growth – thus illustrating a bath-tub effect,
see Fig. 3, where, in particular, the part related to the
last stage of its lifetime is uncertain.
In this paper it is assumed that installations in
life extension should have the same safety levels as
Fig. 1 Theoretical damage tolerance inspection regime to detect cracks before they become critical.
Adapted from reference [4]
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installations in design life, thus giving the same safety
for both people and the environment. A sufficient
safety level in life extension can be obtained by
reducing uncertainty about the installation through
knowledge from operation, dedicated maintenance
with respect to ageing, modifications of structure,
change from ‘safe life thinking’ to ‘damage tolerant
thinking’, or by an appropriate risk-based mainte-
nance approach. This paper considers different ways
of formulating a risk-based maintenance approach
for inspection planning of ageing installations.
Due to common loading, common model uncer-
tainties, and correlation between inspection quali-
ties, it can be expected that information obtained
from inspection of one component can be used, not
only to update the inspection plan for that compo-
nent, but also for other nearby components. Such
system effects can also lead to increased probability
of simultaneous failure in nearby correlated compo-
nents. This aspect is illustrated by an example in
this paper. Further, it is noted that initiation of small
defects/cracks which may coalescence to larger
defects/cracks can occur at more than one position,
i.e. a systems effect along, for example, a welding
can be of importance depending on the length of
the weld and the dependence between the defects/
fatigue cracks.
This paper is a summary of a project performed by
John Dalsgaard Sørensen for the Petroleum Safety
Authority in Norway within their ‘Aging Installations’
project.
2 RISK-BASED INSPECTION PLANNING
In RBI planning the inspection plans are determined
such that the annual probability of failure is less than
a maximum acceptable annual probability of failure,
DPmaxF , which is dependent on the consequences of
fatigue failure being the total collapse of the struc-
ture. Further, the inspection plan should be deter-
mined such that the lifetime total expected costs of
inspection, repair, strengthening, and eventual fail-
ure are minimized.
For fatigue failures the requirements of safety
are typically given in terms of a required FDF. As an
example, reference [16] specifies FDF¼ 10 where
there are ‘Substantial consequences of fatigue failure’
and ‘No access or in the splash zone’. From the FDFs
it is possible to establish the corresponding annual
probabilities of failure for a specific year. For the joints
to be considered in an inspection plan, the acceptance
criteria for the annual probability of fatigue failure
may be assessed through the RSR (reserve stress
ratio)-given failure of each of the individual joints, to
be considered together with the annual probability of
joint fatigue failure.
If the RSR-given joint fatigue failure is known
(e.g. obtained from an USFOS analysis), it is possible
to establish the corresponding annual collapse failure
probability-given fatigue failure, PCOL|FAT, if infor-
mation is available on the applied characteristic
values for the capacities, live loads, and wave height;
Fig. 3 Bath-tubmodel for failure rate for ageing installations
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ratios of the environmental load to the total load;
coefficient of variation of the capacity and the load.
In order to assess the acceptable annual probability
of fatigue failure for a particular joint in a platform, the
reliability of the considered platform must be calcu-
lated conditional on fatigue failure of the considered
joint. The importance of a fatigue failure is measured
by the residual influence factor (RIF) defined as
RIF ¼ RSR
damaged
RSRintact
ð1Þ
where RSRintact is the RSR value for the intact
structure and RSRdamaged is the RSR value for the
structure damaged by fatigue failure of a joint. The
principal relation between RIF and annual collapse
probability is illustrated in Fig. 4.
The implicit code requirement of the safety of the
structure in regard to total collapse may be assessed
through the annual probability of joint fatigue failure
(in the last year in service) PFATj for a joint for which
the consequences of failure are ‘substantial’ (i.e.
design fatigue factor 10). This probability can be
regarded as an acceptance criteria, i.e. PAC. A typical
maximal allowed annual probability of collapse fail-
ure is in the order of PAC¼ 10–5.
On this basis it is possible to establish joint- and
member-specific acceptance criteria in regard to
fatigue failure. For each joint j, the conditional prob-
abilities of structural collapse given failure of the con-
sidered joint PCOL FATj j are determined and the
individual joint acceptance criteria for the annual
probability of joint fatigue failure are found by a first
crude approximation
DPmaxFAT; j ¼
PAC
PCOL FATjj
ð2Þ
The inspection plans must then satisfy
PFATj6DPmaxFAT;j ð3Þ
for all years during the operational life of the structure.
Ersdal [11] considered the life extension of existing
offshore jacket structures including fatigue degrada-
tion and inspection effects in a life extension. A
predictive Bayesian approach is used. Different
inspection and repair methods are considered, indi-
cating that degradation of the structure due to fatigue
crack growth can be controlled by inspection, and
repair leads to a significant extended life. Investiga-
tions show that systems effects related to life exten-
sion and possible combined hazard of wave-in-deck
loading are found to be very important.
In many situations there will be a number of
fatigue crack critical details (components) in an off-
shore steel platform. Assessment of the acceptable
annual fatigue probability of failure for a particular
component can be dependent on the number of fati-
gue critical components. The acceptable annual
probability of fatigue failure of a component is
obtained by considering the importance of the com-
ponent through the conditional probability of its fail-
ure. Given PAC, RIF, and the number of fatigue critical
components, the maximum acceptable component
annual probability of fatigue failure DPmaxFAT can be cal-
culated using a simple upper bound on the probabil-
ity of failure; see reference [3]. As an example DPmaxFAT is
shown in Fig. 5 for PAC¼ 10–5 and N¼ 1, 2, 5, and 10
critical components.
In generic inspection planning, inspection plan-
ning is made by interpolation in a predetermined
database with plans covering the potential applica-
tion domain; see e.g. reference [2]. Given:
(a) the type of fatigue-sensitive detail – and thereby
code-based SN-curve;
(b) the fatigue strength measured by FDF;
(c) the importance of the considered detail for the
ultimate capacity of the structure, measured by
e.g. RIF and RSR;
(d) the member geometry (thickness);
(e) the inspection, repair, and failure costs;
the optimal inspection plan, i.e. the inspection times
and inspection qualities, can be determined. This
inspection plan is generic in the sense that it is repre-
sentative of the given characteristics of the consid-
ered details, i.e. the SN-curve, FDF, RSR, and the
inspection, repair, and failure costs.
This inspection planning procedure requires infor-
mation on costs of failure, inspections, and repairs.
Often, these are not available, and the inspection
planning is based on the requirement that the annual
probability of failure in all years has to satisfy the
reliability constraint implied by DPmaxF . Further, in
RBI planning, the assumption that no cracks are
found at the inspections is usually made. If a crack
is found, it is often assumed to be perfectly repaired
and a new inspection plan has to be made based on
that observation. The action after detection of a crack
0.00
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Fig. 4 Example relationship between RIFs and annual col-
lapse probability of failure – P(COL|FAT)
Proc. IMechE Vol. 222 Part O: J. Risk and Reliability JRR136  IMechE 2008
406 J D Sørensen and G Ersdal
can on the other hand be that small cracks are
grinded and large cracks are repaired by welding,
for example.
The reliability of inspections can be modelled in
many different ways. Often probability of detection
(POD) curves are used to model the reliability of the
inspections.
In order to model the influence of inspections and
estimate the probability of failure, a probabilistic
fracture mechanical (FM) model is needed. This
model is often calibrated such that it gives the same
reliability level as a code-based probabilistic SN-
approach using Miner’s rule of linear accumulation
of damage.
If a bilinear SN-curve is applied, the SN-relation
can be written
N ¼ K1 Dsð Þm1 for N6NC ð4Þ
N ¼ K2 Dsð Þm2 for N>NC ð5Þ
where Ds is the stress range; N is the number of cycles
to failure; K1, m1 are the material parameters for
N 6 NC; K2, m2 are the material parameters for
N>NC; NC is the number of cycles where the slope
of the SN-curve changes from m1 to m2; and DsC is
the stress range corresponding to NC.
The probability of failure is calculated using the
limit state equation
g ¼ D
X
si>DsC
niTL
K1 XSsið Þm1

X
si<DsC
niTL
K2 XSsið Þm2
ð6Þ
D is the model uncertainty related to Palmgren–
Miner’s rule for linear damage accumulation, TL is
the service life, si is the stress range in group i, and XS
is a stochastic variable modelling the model
uncertainty related to waves and SCF (wave load
response). XS is assumed lognormal distributed with
mean value¼ 1 and COV¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
COV2wave þ COV2SCF
q
.
The coefficient of variation COVwave models the
uncertainty on the wave load, foundation stiffness,
and stress ranges. COVSCF models the uncertainty in
the stress concentration factors (SCFs) and local joint
flexibilities (LFJs). log Ki is modelled by a normal
distributed stochastic variable according to a specific
SN-curve.
Using the illustrative stochastic model in Table 1,
based on Faber et al. [3] and equation (6), the prob-
ability of failure in the service life and the annual
probability of failure can be obtained. It is noted
that the stochastic model for logK1 and logK2 is
based on fatigue tests with variable amplitude load.
A fracture mechanical modelling of the crack
growth is applied assuming that the crack can
be modelled by a two-dimensional semi-elliptical
crack. It is assumed that the fatigue life may be
represented by a fatigue initiation life and a fatigue
propagation life
N ¼ NI þNP ð7Þ
where N is the number of stress cycles to failure, NI is
the number of stress cycles to crack propagation, and
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Fig. 5 Maximum acceptable annual probability of fatigue failure DPmaxFAT for each fatigue critical detail as a
function of RIF. PAC¼ 10–5
Table1 Example of stochastic model for the SN-approach
Variable Distribution*
Expected
value
Standard
deviation
D LN 1 0
ZSCF LN 1 COVSCF
Zwave LN 1 COVwave
m1 D 3
log K1 N 12.048 0.218
m2 D 4
log K2 N 13.980 0.291
log K1 and log K2 are assumed fully correlated
*D: deterministic, N: normal, LN: lognormal.
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NP is the number of stress cycles from initiation to
crack through.
The number of stress cycles from initiation to
crack through is determined on the basis of a two-
dimensional crack growth model. The crack growth
can be described by the following two coupled differ-
ential equations
da
dN
¼ CA DKAð Þm a N0ð Þ ¼ a0
dc
dN
¼ CC DKCð Þm c NIð Þ ¼ c0
ð8Þ
where CA, CC, and m are material parameters, and a0
and c0 describe the initial crack depth a and crack
length c respectively, after NI cycles. The stress
intensity ranges are DKA and DKC. The crack
initiation time NI is modelled as Weibull distributed
with expected value m10 and coefficient of variation
equal to 0.35 [17]. The limit state function is written
g xð Þ ¼ N  nt ð9Þ
where t is time in the interval from 0 to the service
life TL.
In order to model the effect of different weld
qualities, two different values of the crack depth at
initiation a0 can be used: 0.1mm and 0.4mm corre-
sponding approximately to high and low material
control. The critical crack depth ac is often taken as
the thickness of the tubular member. An example of
a probabilistic modelling used in a fracture mechan-
ical reliability analysis is shown in Table 2.
The parameters mlnCC and m0 are fitted such that
the difference between the probability distribution
functions for the fatigue life determined using the
SN-approach and the fracture mechanical approach
is minimized as illustrated in the examples below.
A steel jacket structure with service life TL¼ 40
years and located in the North Sea is considered.
The characteristics for some fatigue sensitive details
are shown in Table 3, where TF is the fatigue lifetime
for deterministic design. The resulting inspection
intervals are shown in Table 4 for a maximum accep-
table annual probability of failure, DPmaxF ¼ 10–5. It is
seen that the time to first inspection increases with
the FDF, FDF¼TF/TL, and that after the first inspec-
tion, the inspection time intervals generally increase
with time; but for low FDFs they decrease in the first
part of the design lifetime.
Note that a basic assumption in the reliability-
based inspection planning approach used in this
paper is that a Bayesian approach can be used. This
implies that probabilities of failure can be updated
in a consistent way when new information becomes
available. The Bayesian approach is also consistent
with rational risk analysis and decision-making based
on the framework of pre-posterior analysis from
classical Bayesian decision theory [18, 19] and imple-
mented as described in reference [9]. This basic
assumption is also very important in order to under-
stand why longer inspection time intervals are
obtained when no-finds at the inspections are
assumed.
The uncertainties in Table 2 can be divided into
aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory uncertainty is inher-
ent variation associated with the physical system
or the environment – it can be characterized as
irreducible uncertainty or random uncertainty.
Epistemic uncertainty is uncertainty due to lack of
knowledge of the system or the environment – it
can be characterized as subjective or reducible uncer-
tainty. The epistemic uncertainties such as ZSCF,
Zwave, and Y are time-invariant and therefore the
event inspection and ‘no-find’ can be considered as
a proof-loading effect, implying that each inspection
reduces these uncertainties, giving rise to a decrease
Table 2 Example of uncertainty modelling used in the
fracture mechanical reliability analysis
Variable Distribution* Expected value
Standard
deviation
NI W mI0 0.35 m0
a0 D 0.4mm
lnCC N mlnCC 0.77
m D m-value corres-
ponding to the low
cycle part of the
bilinear SN-curve
ZSCF LN 1
Zwave LN 1
ac D T (thickness)
Y LN 1 0.1
lnCC and NI are correlated with correlation coefficient rlnðCCÞ;NI ¼ 0.5
*D: deterministic, N: normal, LN: lognormal, W: Weibull.
Table 3 Example cases
Case COVwave COVSCF T (mm) TF (year)
1 0.1 0.15 20 100
2 0.1 0.15 20 120
3 0.1 0.15 20 140
4 0.1 0.15 20 160
5 0.1 0.15 20 180
6 0.1 0.15 20 200
Table 4 Example inspection time intervals in years
Inspection number 1 2 3 4 5
Case 1 – FDF¼ 2.5 13 6 5 7 9
Case 2 – FDF¼ 3.0 16 7 7 9
Case 3 – FDF¼ 3.5 19 9 9
Case 4 – FDF¼ 4.0 22 10
Case 5 – FDF¼ 4.5 25 12
Case 6 – FDF¼ 5.0 28
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in the total uncertainty after each inspection – and
thus longer inspection intervals in the normal design
lifetime. In general, epistemic uncertainties are domi-
nant in many applications for offshore installations.
3 INSPECTION PLANNING FOR OLDER
INSTALLATIONS
This section describes various investigations in
reliability-based inspection planning with the aim of
discussing and investigating how decreased inspec-
tion time intervals could be obtained when time
approaches and goes beyond the design lifetime. A
shorter interval between inspections is intuitively
expected when structure is used beyond the design
lifetime, but as seen above, traditional reliability-
based inspection techniques, when applied after the
design life, normally result in increasing inspection
time intervals.
The following assumptions/observations are in-
cluded in the considerations for a modified method
for reliability-based inspection planning for older
installations:
1. For ageing platforms, several small cracks are
assumed to be observed – implying an increased
risk of crack initiation (and coalescence of
small cracks) and growth – thus modelling a
bath-tub effect.
2. The repair of cracks can imply weakening of the
material, implying subsequent crack initiation
and growth.
3. Observed cracks can be divided into cracks due
to fabrication defects and fatigue-growing cracks:
(a) fabrication cracks should be detected by fab-
rication control and/or an initial inspections,
and are therefore not considered in the fol-
lowing;
(b) growing fatigue cracks which should be
detected by inspections – typically 10 per
cent (of welds) are inspected and, from these,
5 per cent have cracks (defects).
The following models are considered for modifying
inspection intervals for older installations:
(a) increase of expected value of initial crack size with
time – owing to the coalescence of smaller cracks;
(b) non-perfect repairs – by detection of cracks, the
repair is not perfect, and a new crack is initiated;
(c) human errors in inspections (beyond uncertainty
included in POD-curves);
(d) increased rate of crack initiation – adjustment of
the crack initiation time such that the initiation
of cracks increases with time (bath-tub effect).
The increase of crack initiation can be in excess
of the crack initiation expected at the design
stage (and obtained by reliability-based calibra-
tion to SN-curves) owing to the ageing effects
(e.g. by coalescence of small defects/cracks).
The above effects also apply in the case of extended
lifetime. Representative examples are used to evalu-
ate the different models.
The basic assumption in the RBI approach descri-
bed in section 2 is that in a critical detail a defect/
crack initiates at some time and is modelled by a sto-
chastic variable. However, as mentioned above, it is
assumed that for ageing installations the damage
initiation rates follow a bath-tub form; see Fig. 3.
Initial damages are mainly due to fabrication/con-
struction defects, and at the end of the expected life-
time the damage rate is assumed to increase owing
to widespread fatigue damage effects. In Fig. 6 a sim-
ple combined model is illustrated where the ‘bath-
tub’ effect is combined with the ‘usual’ defect/crack
initiation model. The model could be modified in dif-
ferent ways, but the main idea is to introduce more
cracks at the end of the lifetime.
In model (d) it is assumed that more defects/cracks
are initiated when time is approaching the design
lifetime (owing to weakening by age effects) than
assumed in the initial calibration of the fracture
mechanics model. This model corresponds to the
model in Fig. 6.
In the examples below, the extra cracks are
assumed to be initiated following a simple linear
Fig. 6 A combined model for damage initiation with ageing defects
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or constant model in the time interval [T0, TE]; see
Figs 7 and 8. The extra cracks are assumed to be
initiated in the fatigue critical area considered.
Further, it is assumed that the expected number of
extra cracks is (1–d)/d such that aI¼ 2(1–d)/(TE–T0)
with linear increase in the initiation rate and
aI¼ (1–d)/(TE–T0) with constant increase in the initia-
tion rate; see Figs 7 and 8.
Monte Carlo simulations are used to estimate the
reliability as a function of time by the SN-approach
and by the FM approach for the models proposed
above. In order to reduce the computational effort,
a one-dimensional fracture mechanics model is
used. The stochastic models used are shown in
Tables 5 and 6.
The parameters in the fracture mechanical model
are calibrated to
mI0¼ 5 years and mlnCC¼25:5
The reliability index (based on accumulated prob-
ability of failure) is shown in Fig. 9. It is seen that a
satisfactory agreement between the SN and the FM
approach is obtained.
RBI planning with no modifications results in
the inspection times for DPmaxF ¼ 10–4 shown in
Table 7. It is seen that inspection time intervals
increase with time – most of the fastest growing
cracks are detected and repaired in the first inspec-
tions, and thus only a few critical cracks are left
when time approaches the design lifetime.
The three models (a), (b), and (c) described above
do not result in decreased inspection time intervals.
The main reason is believed to be the statistical effect
of the inspection, namely that fast-growing cracks are
detected by the first inspections – or, if not, then by
one of the following inspections – leading to increas-
ing inspection time intervals.
In model (d) extra cracks are assumed to initiate in
the time interval [T0, TE]; see Figs 7 and 8.
The inspection time intervals (in years) are with
DPmaxF ¼ 10–4 determined in four situations:
1. d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼ [25–60]; see Tables 8a
(linear) and 9a (constant).
2. d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼ [40–60]; see Tables 8b
(linear) and 9b (constant).
3. d¼ 0.50 and [T0, TE]¼ [25–60]; see Tables 8c
(linear) and 9c (constant).
4. d¼ 0.50 and [T0, TE]¼ [40–60]; see Tables 8d
(linear) and 9d (constant).
Firstly, it is noted that owing to a limited number of
simulations (2 · 106) the inspection times have a
‘standard error’ of 1–2 years – therefore, some devia-
tions in the inspection times for year 25 are observed.
From the figures, it is seen that when many extra
cracks (d¼ 0.25) are initiated, the inspection time
intervals decrease, especially if the extra cracks start
early (after 25 years). As expected the constant model
results in the largest decrease at the beginning of
the time interval [40–60]. Note that a reason for the
difference in ratio between the first and second
Fig. 7 Initiation rate of extra defects/cracks – linear model
Fig. 8 Initiation rate of extra defects/cracks – constant
model
Table 5 Stochasticmodel for SN-approach in examples
Variable Distribution Expected value Standard deviation
D LN 1 0.2
ZSCF LN 1 COVSCF¼ 0.10
Zwave LN 1 COVwave¼ 0.30
TL D 25 years
TF D 75 years
m1 D 3
log K1 N 12.048 0.218
m2 D 4
log K2 N 13.980 0.291
log K1 and log K2 are assumed fully correlated
Table 6 Uncertaintymodelling used in the fracture
mechanical reliability analysis
Variable Distribution* Expected value Standard deviation
NI W m10 (fitted) 0.35 m0
a0 D 0.4mm
lnCC N mlnCC (fitted) 0.77
m D 3
ZSCF LN 1 0.10
Zwave LN 1 0.30
ac D T (thickness)
Y LN 1 0.1
T D 50mm
TL D 25–60 years
lnCC and NI are correlated with correlation coefficient rlnðCCÞ;NI ¼ 0.5
*D: deterministic, N: normal, LN: lognormal, W: Weibull.
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Table 7 Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘No modification.’ DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 7 9 11 14 18 22 29 39 53
Inspection interval 6 1 2 2 3 4 4 7 10 14
Table 8a Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 8 9 11 13 17 22 30 38 43 48 53 58
Inspection interval 6 2 1 2 2 4 5 8 8 5 5 5 5
Table 8b Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [40–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 8 9 11 13 17 22 30 40 51 55 59
Inspection interval 6 2 1 2 2 4 5 8 10 11 4 4
Table 8c Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.50 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 7 8 10 12 15 18 23 30 40 47 55
Inspection interval 7 1 2 2 3 3 5 7 10 7 8
Table 8d Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.50 and
[T0, TE]¼ [40–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 8 10 12 15 18 24 31 41 55
Inspection interval 6 2 2 2 3 3 6 7 10 14
Table 9a Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Constant model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 7 9 11 13 16 20 27 33 38 42 46 52 58
Inspection interval 6 1 2 2 2 3 4 7 6 5 4 4 6 6
0
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Fig. 9 Reliability index (accumulated) as a function of time for the SN-approach and calibrated
FM-approach
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inspection intervals in Tables 4 and 8/9 is the differ-
ent maximum annual probability of failure (Table 4:
DPmaxF ¼ 10–5, and Tables 8/9: DPmaxF ¼ 10–4).
The inspection time intervals (in years) are with
DPmaxF ¼ 10–3 determined in three situations:
1. no extra cracks; see Table 10;
2. d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼ [25–60]; see Table 11
(linear);
3. d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼ [25–60]; see Table 12 (con-
stant).
Results similar as for DPmaxF ¼ 10–4 are observed.
The inspection time intervals decrease when extra
cracks are initiated, especially with the ‘constant
model’.
Figure 10 shows the annual probability of failure as
a function of time without extra crack initiation (i.e.
unmodified model and denoted ‘no modification’),
with extra crack initiation (linear [10; 25] and aI¼
3 · 2/15), and with inspections when DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
and DPmaxF ¼ 10–3. The annual probability of failure
is seen to increase significantly when extra initiation
of cracks is included. However, using inspections, it
is seen that it is possible to obtain a maximum annual
probability of failure below DPmaxF .
4 SYSTEMS EFFECTS FOR OLDER
INSTALLATIONS
For many installations there will be a (large) number
of critical details (components), implying the follow-
ing important aspects.
1. Assessment of the acceptable annual fatigue
probability of failure for a particular component
can depend on a number of fatigue critical com-
ponents. The acceptable annual probability of
failure of a component is obtained considering
the importance of the component through the
conditional probability of failure given failure of
the component.
2. Owing to common loading, common model
uncertainties, and correlation between inspection
qualities, it can be expected that information
obtained from inspection of one component can
be used to update the inspection plan not only
for that component, but also for other nearby com-
ponents. Further, the common history and loading
also imply an increased risk of several correlated
components failing at almost the same time.
3. In some cases the development of a defect/crack
in one component causes a stiffness reduction
and an increased damping, implying that loads
could be redistributed, thereby increasing the
stress ranges in some of the other critical details.
Table 9b Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Constant model’ with d¼ 0.25 and [T0,
TE]¼ [40–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 7 9 11 13 16 20 27 35 45 49 54 58
Inspection interval 6 1 2 2 2 3 4 7 8 10 4 5 4
Table 9c Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Constant model’ with d¼ 0.50 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 8 10 12 15 19 24 31 38 45 53
Inspection interval 6 2 2 2 3 4 5 7 7 7 8
Table 9d Inspection times and inspection time intervals in years. ‘Constant model’ with d¼ 0.50 and
[T0, TE]¼ [40–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–4
Inspection time 6 8 10 12 15 19 24 31 42 51 57
Inspection interval 6 2 2 2 3 4 5 7 11 9 6
Table 10 Inspection times and inspection time intervals
in years. ‘No modification.’ DPmaxF ¼ 10–3
Inspection time 14 22 37
Inspection interval 14 8 15
Table 11 Inspection times and inspection time intervals
in years. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–3
Inspection time 14 21 31 45 56
Inspection interval 14 7 10 14 11
Table 12 Inspection times and inspection time intervals
in years. ‘Constant model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60]. DPmaxF ¼ 10–3
Inspection time 14 21 31 43 52
Inspection interval 14 7 10 12 9
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Table 13 illustrates the stochastic variables typi-
cally used in a fracture mechanical model for fatigue
analysis, based partly on Table 6.
Considering as an example two critical compo-
nents, the limit state equations can be written
g1ðtÞ ¼ ac;1  a1ðXLoad;1;XStrength;1; tÞ ð10Þ
g2ðtÞ ¼ ac;2  a2ðXLoad;2;XStrength;2; tÞ ð11Þ
where aj(XLoad, j, XStrength, j, t) is the crack depth at
time t for component j; ac, j is the critical crack
depth for component j; XLoad,j are the load variables
(ZSCF, Zwave, a, and b) for component j; and
XStrength, j are the strength variables (NI, a0, lnCC,
and Y ) for component j.
The events corresponding to detection of a crack at
time T can similarly be written
h1ðT Þ ¼ cd;1  c1ðXLoad;1;XStrength;1;TÞ6 0 ð12Þ
h2ðT Þ ¼ cd;2  c2ðXLoad;2;XStrength;2;TÞ6 0 ð13Þ
where cj(XLoad, j, XStrength, j, cd, j, T) is the crack length at
time T for component j, and cd, j is the smallest
detectable crack length for component j. Note that the
crack depth aj (t) and crack length cj (t) are related
through the coupled differential equations in (8).
The stochastic variables in different components
will typically be dependent. The load-related vari-
ables can be assumed to be fully dependent as the
loading is common to most components. However,
in special cases different types of component, and
components placed a long distance between each
other, can be less dependent. The strength variables
NI, a0, and lnCC will typically be independent as the
material properties vary from component to compo-
nent. However, some dependence can be expected
for components fabricated with the same production
techniques and from the same basic materials.
Updated probabilities of failure of components
1 and 2 given no detection of cracks in detail 1
and 2 are
PF;1 1j ¼ P g1 tð Þ60 h1 Tð Þ>0j½  ð14Þ
PF;2 2j ¼ P g2 tð Þ60 h2 Tð Þ>0j½  ð15Þ
PF;2 1j ¼ P g2 tð Þ60 h1 Tð Þ>0j½  ð16Þ
PF;1 2j ¼ P g1 tð Þ60 h2 Tð Þ>0j½  ð17Þ
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Fig. 10 Annual probability of failure as a function of time. ‘Linear model’ with d¼ 0.25 and
[T0, TE]¼ [25–60] and with inspections when DPmaxF ¼ 104 and DPmaxF ¼ 103
Table 13 Stochastic variables for fracture mechanical
analysis
Variable Description
Strength
variables
NI Number of stress cycles to initiation of
crack
a0 Initial crack length
ln CC Crack growth parameter
Y Geometry function
Load
variables
ZSCF Uncertainty stress range calculation
Zwave Uncertainty wave load
a, b Weibull parameter in long-term stress
range distribution
Inspection
quality
cd POD curve
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Equations (14) and (15) represent situations where
a component is updated with inspection of the same
component. Equations (16) and (17) represent situa-
tions where a component is updated with inspection
of another component. The above formulae can
easily be extended to cases where more components
are inspected.
Figure 11 illustrates the effect of inspection plan-
ning on a component if this or another nearby com-
ponent is inspected. The largest effect on reliability
updating and thus inspection planning is obtained
upon inspecting the same component or inspecting
another component with a large correlation with the
considered component.
As an example, two components are considered of
the same stochastic model as in Table 6. It is assumed
that component 1 is inspected, and if a crack is
detected, then both components 1 and 2 are repaired.
Further, it is assumed that each of the stochastic vari-
ables ZSCF, Zwave, and Y are fully correlated in the two
elements, e.g. ZSCF in component 1 is fully correlated
with ZSCF in component 2, and ZSCF and Zwave are
independent. NI and lnCC are assumed independent
in the two components. No extra cracks are initiated
and DPmaxF ¼ 10–3. Inspections should be performed
in years 14, 23, and 35. Figure 12 shows the accumu-
lated probability of failure for the two components.
It is seen that the probability of failure for component
2 decreases, compared with no inspection, but is
much higher than for the inspected component 1.
Next, it is assumed that extra cracks are initiated
with the ‘linear model’ with d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼
[25–60].
Inspections should be performed in years 12, 17,
28, 38, 48, and 54. Figure 13 shows the accumu-
lated probability of failure for the two components.
It is seen that the probability of failure for compo-
nent 2 decreases slightly compared with no inspec-
tion, but is much higher than for the inspected
component 1.
Fig. 11 Reliability index as a function of time for component 1 and updated reliability if inspection of
component 1 at time T0, or of component 2 at time T0 with large and small positive correlation
with component 1
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Fig. 12 Accumulated probability of failure as a function of time, without extra crack initiation and
DPmaxF ¼ 103
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If it is assumed that the stochastic variables model-
ling lnCC in component 1 and 2 are fully correlated,
and if no extra cracks are initiated, inspections should
be performed in years 14, 23, and 35. Figure14 shows
the accumulated probability of failure for the two com-
ponents. It is seen that now the probability of failure for
component 2 is almost the same as for component 1.
These results indicate that a relatively high degree
of correlation between the uncertain parameters in
different components is needed in order to obtain
substantial information that can be used in inspec-
tion planning.
5 SUMMARY
The basic principles in reliability and RBI planning
are described. The basic assumption made in
risk/reliability-based inspection planning is that a
Bayesian approach can be used. The Bayesian app-
roach and the no-crack detection assumption imply
that the inspection time intervals usually become
longer and longer. Further, inspection planning based
on the RBI approach implies that single components
are considered, one at a time, but with the acceptable
reliability level assessed based on the consequence for
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Fig. 13 Accumulated probability of failure as a function of time, with extra crack initiation – linear model
with d¼ 0.25 and [T0, TE]¼ [25–60] and DPmaxF ¼ 10–3
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Fig. 14 Accumulated probability of failure as a function of time, without extra crack initiation
and DPmaxF ¼ 10–3
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the whole structure in case of fatigue failure of a single
component.
The following two aspects are considered with
the aim to develop/extend the RBI approach for older
installations; namely, that for ageing structures several
small defects/cracks are often observed – implying an
increased risk for defect/crack initiation (and coales-
cence of small defects/cracks) and increased defect/
crack growth. This should imply shorter inspection
time intervals for ageing structures.
Different approaches for updating inspection plans
for older installations are proposed in order to
achieve decreased inspection intervals as the struc-
tures are ageing. The most promising method con-
sists in increasing the rate of defects/crack initiation
at the end of the expected lifetime – corresponding
to a bath-tub hazard rate effect. The approach is illu-
strated for welded steel details in platforms, and
implies that inspection time intervals decrease at
the end of the platform lifetime. Note that data are
needed to verify the increased crack initiation model.
These data can be direct observations of cracks in
older installations or indirect information from
inspection programmes.
The approaches described are especially developed
for the inspection planning of fatigue cracks, but can
also be used for various other deterioration processes
where inspection is relevant, including corrosion,
chloride ingress in concrete with possible corrosion
of reinforcement and wear.
Different system aspects are considered, including
the assessment of the acceptable annual probability
of failure for one component dependent on the num-
ber of critical components. Common loading, model
uncertainties, etc. imply that information obtained
from the inspection of one component can be used
to update the inspection plan not only for that com-
ponent, but also for other nearby components.
Further, the common history and loading also imply
an increased risk that several correlated components
can fail at almost the same time. An example indi-
cates that a high degree of correlation between the
uncertain parameters in different components is
needed in order to obtain substantial information
that can be used in inspection planning.
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